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Taking Self-Determination Seriously:
When Can Cultural and Political Minorities Control
Their Own Fate?
Paul A. Clark*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the late 1980s, Iraqi warplanes dropped chemical weapons on Kurdish
villages, causing thousands of civilian deaths. The international community took
no significant steps to punish this action; in fact, countries continued to supply
Iraq with weapons. This inaction stands in stark contrast to the international
response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a few years later. The international
community took no action against Iraq for gassing Kurds because most
countries regarded the action as an "internal matter" rather than a violation of
international law.
Whether international law could prevent or punish mass murder of
minorities is the question that this Development seeks to answer.
One possible way to bring mass murder under international law is to
abandon the principle of territorial sovereignty, that is, the idea that the "internal
matters" of a state are subject only to the national laws of that state. This idea is
commonly traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the
Thirty Years War. Alleged mistreatment of religious minorities had been put
forth as sufficient justification for one country to invade another, but the Treaty
of Westphalia decreed that how governments treat their own subjects would be
regarded under international law as an internal matter The doctrine of national
BA 1987, Christendom College; PhD 1996, The Catholic University of America; JD Candidate
2005, The University of Chicago.
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, Exorising the Ghost of Wesophalia: Building World
Order in the New Millennium 129-32 (Prentice Hall 2002). It should be noted that the Treatysigned by virtually every major country in continental Europe-affirmed the fact that "religious
liberty" was not guaranteed under international law. Id at 129-30. Freedom of religion was
regarded as a subversive and destabilizing doctrine that would lead to conflict and undermine
the integrity of the State.
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sovereignty remains a cornerstone of international law. The UN Charter Chapter
1 (Purposes and Principles) declares: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."2 Regardless of the
practical arguments in favor of abandoning the Westphalian principle of national
sovereignty, it is safe to say that such a change would be a radical departure from
existing and long-standing precedents of international law. This Development
seeks to demonstrate that existing provisions of international law regarding selfdetermination (especially as that concept has developed just in the last few years)
already contain a framework for preventing the mass murder of minority groups.

II. SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The United Nations Charter declares that one of the fundamental purposes
of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 3
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")
begins with the declaration, "[a]l peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."4 The ICCPR goes on
to declare that the "[s]tates Parties to the present Covenant ...shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."' Thus,
the idea of "self-determination of peoples" is a fundamental principle of
6
international law.
Despite the fact that self-determination has been a basic concept of
international law for decades, until recently, preserving the territorial integrity of
existing states took precedence. In the last decade, however, the international
community has sanctioned the independence of minority groups within
previously existing states as a method of resolving conflict and oppression. A
weakness, however, is that a minority group's right to self-determination appears
2

United Nations Charter, art 2, 7.

3

Id, art 1, 2.

4

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), art 1, 6 ILM 368, 369 (1967)
(hereinafter ICCPR).
Id.

5
6

For a more complete list of international agreements establishing the principle of selfdetermination, see Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, ed, The Self-Determination of Peoples 407-12 (Lynne
Rienner 2002) (Appendix D: Principal Treaties and Agreements Relating to SelfDetermination).
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to receive little or no support from the international community until a genocide
or ethnic cleansing is well under way. This Development concludes that if the
right to self-determination is going to serve its purpose of preventing conflict, it
must be an inherent right of cultural and political minorities before persecution
begins, not after.
III. WHAT IS "SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES"?
To say that under international law every "people" is entitled to "selfdetermination" leaves unanswered two problems still very much in flux, namely,
what is "a people" and what does "self-determination" mean?7 The ICCPR
states that peoples "freely determine their political status." This language
strongly suggests the ability to determine political dependence or independence,
and in fact, General Assembly Resolution 1514 declares that self-determination
includes the right to complete independence, at least in the colonial setting.8
Nevertheless, self-determination is not limited to a simple alternative between
independence or dependence. General Assembly Resolution 2625 speaks of
several different modes of exercising self-determination: "The establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of selfdetermination by that people." 9
Aside from the meaning of self-determination, the more difficult and
controversial question is how to determine when a group qualifies as "a people"
under international law. Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein, one of the
world's leading authorities on self-determination, has recently suggested that
international law move away from "the rather theoretical concept of 'peoples"'
to self-determination for local communities down "to the smallest community,"
because a community is easier to define than "a people."' While Hans Adam's
suggestion may provide a simpler theoretical framework, it is safe to say that his
suggestions do not reflect the present state of international law as to what
constitutes "a people." At the same time, there is no reason to deny a group
status as "a people" simply because they are too small. For example, an island
As Lloyd Cutler has written, "'Self-determination' is one of those unexceptional goals that can
be neither defined nor opposed." This suggests that while self-determination is now accepted as
basic, how one defines it remains problematic. Fonvard, in Morton H. Halperin and David J.

8
9

10

Scheffer, Sef-Determinationin the New World Orderxi, xi (Carnegie 1992).
General Assembly Res No 15/1514, UN Doc A/RES/15/1514 (1960).
General Assembly Res No 25/2625, UN Doc A/RES/25/2625 (1970).
Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein, Forward,in Danspeckgruber, ed, The Self-Determinaion of
Peoplesix, xii-xiii (cited in note 6).
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may have no more than a few dozen inhabitants, but still have a unique
language, culture, and traditions that clearly entitle it to self-determination under
international law. City-states such as Vatican City and Monaco are not unknown
in the international community. There is no reason that the remote South Pacific
island Pitcairn should be denied self-determination just because there are fewer
than one hundred residents.
Unfortunately there is not now, and there never has been any widespread
agreement on what makes a group seeking self-determination a people. Most
commentators will agree that distinct "racial groups" are generally entitled to
qualify as a people.' Some authors suggest that a people, or "nation," be
regarded as any group "having a common and distinctive history, language,
culture, and/or religion."' 2 For example, in the last few years, the international
community has decided that Bosnians, 3 Kosovars, 4 and the East Timorese 5 are
entitled to self-determination and presumably qualify as "peoples," at least16
partially on the ground that their religions set them apart from majority groups.
This religious distinctiveness is also true of Northern Ireland, the resolution of
which has been another notable achievement for the principle of selfdetermination as a tool to halt violence. Since the British Parliament in the Good
Friday Agreements consented to permit a greater level of autonomy to Northern
Ireland, and acknowledged their right of self-determination, there has been a
dramatic reduction of violence in that war torn corner of Ireland." The world is
full of groups pressing similar claims for status as "a people."' 8
11
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

See, for example, Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A

Legal Reappraisal 147

(Cambridge 1995).
See, for example, Paul H. Brietzke, Seff-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating
Political Conflict, in Robert McCorquodale, ed, Self-Determination in International Law 77, 78
(Ashgate Dartmouth 2000).
In 1995, under strong international pressure, Yugoslavia recognized the independence of Bosnia
by signing the Dayton Accords.
In 1999, following 78 days of NATO bombing, Yugoslavia agreed to recognize the autonomy,
but not the independence, of Kosovo.
In 1999, again under strong international pressure, Indonesia recognized the independence of
East Timor.
The Bosnians and Kosovars, who sought to separate from Orthodox Christians, are largely
Muslims, while the East Timorese, who sought to separate from a predominantly Muslim
Indonesia, are largely Catholics.
Whatever Happens, the Good Friday Agreement Has Achieved Its Purpose,The Independent (London)
24 (Nov 29, 2003). Northern Ireland is also a good example of the fact that although selfdetermination does not necessarily mean independence, self-government coupled with the
comforting knowledge that the people are entitled to independence whenever they so wish can
result in both the protection of minorities and political stability.
Appendix C in Danspeckgruber, ed, The Sef-Determinationof Peoples at 393-405 (cited in note 6),
lists some 170 groups vying for self-determination since 1990, about two dozen of which have
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Another criterion for qualification as "a people" is usually an established
claim and link to a particular territory. However, there are sovereign tribes that
issue license plates, operate courts, and perform similar state functions that
exercise no territorial sovereignty, but nonetheless exercise authority over
members of the tribe. 9 Finally, more ambiguous than groups distinguished by
culture are differences which can best be described as political. The differences
between Taiwan and mainland China, for example, are more political than
cultural.
Historically, of course, international recognition as "a people" depended on
the ability of the group seeking recognition to achieve military success. When
thirteen of England's colonies in North America declared their independence in
July of 1776, no European country recognized them as independent until they
managed to defeat the British army at Saratoga more than a year later.2" Britain
refused to recognize its colonies' independence for another four years until the
defeat and capture of another British army at Yorktown.2 Similarly, when Texas
declared its independence from Mexico, no country in the world recognized it
until it managed to defeat a Mexican army and capture its leader.22 Selfdetermination has been achieved in practice by the sword or the bayonet.
Clearly, appeal to the sword is unacceptable under modern international
law. If international law could determine when a group is entitled to selfdetermination, then wars of independence (or "national liberation") would be a
thing of the past. This was the laudable goal of the international provisions on
self-determination. While the provisions for self-determination are often
expressed in terms of universal human rights, one ought not lose sight of the

19

20
21
22

gained international recognition as independent nations, such as East Timor. Brietzke argues
that there are as many as 5,000 distinct peoples, or "nations," in the world. Brietzke, SelfDetermination,orJurispnrdenialConfusion at 78 (cited in note 12). By another author's estimation
"[t]here are some 5,000 indigenous peoples in the world today." Ward Churchill, Perversions of
Justice: IndigenousPeoples andAngloamericanLaw 51 (City Lights 2003).
One such example is the Cherokee Nation in Oklahoma, which does not have a reservation but
instead has what is called a "Tribal Jurisdictional Service Area," stretching over 14 counties of
northeastern Oklahoma. In effect, Cherokee living within this area can apply for membership to
the tribe and qualify for various government benefits and services, such as license plates. See
the Cherokee website, available online at <http://www.cherokee.org> (visited Oct 24, 2004),
which includes a map of their Nation available online at <http://www.cherokee.org/
Extras/Maps/14countytjsa.gif> (visited Oct 24, 2004).
Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomagy of the American Revolution 58-61 (D. Appleton-Century 1935).
Id at 190-92.
For information on Texas's efforts to gain international recognition, see Diplomatic Relations of the
Republic of Texas, The Handbook of Texas Online, available online at
<http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/onine/articles/view/DD/mgdl.html> (visited Oct
24, 2004).
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very concrete reason that self-determination is part of international law:
prevention of armed conflict.23
Looking back at the original understanding of the self-determination
provisions of the UN Charter and Covenants, it seems that despite the
expansive language used in the documents, many countries had sought to limit
the application of "self-determination." Although expressed as an absolute
principle of international law, in the 1940s self-determination of peoples tended
to be viewed more as a "goal to be attained at some indefinite date in the
24

future.

Countries with large indigenous populations were obviously hesitant to
accept a strong interpretation of self-determination because they feared that
their own indigenous minorities might assert claims of independence. In this
group we can include the United States, which remains fearful of the demand of
some Native American nations for independence. i
A second reason for trying to read the meaning of self-determination of
peoples narrowly was the fear that a liberal reading would lead to "political
instability" and spawn new "national liberation movements." Some might view
this as a legitimate concern; others might think it was merely a case of national
leaders thinking it more important to defend their power base than to protect
the rights of disenfranchised minority groups. Put another way, if only sitting
rulers get to "vote" on international law, wouldn't we expect them to value
political stability?26 Guyora Binder, in fact, traces this obviously self-interested
policy back to the Vienna Conference of 1815, where the major powers at
Vienna expressed membership in the community of nations as a privilege to be
handed out to existing national governments-that is, there was no "right to
23

24

25

26

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Res No 217 A (11), UN Doc
A/810 at 71 (1948), suggests that all "human rights" should be viewed in this way, declaring in
the Preamble that "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort,
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule
of law." Not all of the rights listed, however, seem to fall into this category, such as the right to
"holidays with pay" declared in Article 24.
Guyora Binder, The Casefor Self-Determinaion, 29 Stan J Intl L 223, 231 (1993), citing Yehuda Z.
Blum, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determinaion, 10 Israel L Rev 509, 511 (1975)
(internal citations omitted).
One United Nations representative from a tribe in Canada wrote: "[t]he United States
repeatedly has opposed funding for United Nations programs aimed at indigenous communities
... [including] opposing the launching of a United Nations study of indigenous treaties on the
grounds that it was anti-American .... Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous SelfDeterminalion, in John R. Wunder, ed, Native Ameican Sovereignty 143, 156 (Garland 1999).
The "political instability" argument could also be used against any of the human rights listed in
the international canon. Might not a group's demand for religious freedom or "holidays with
pay" lead to violence? Should the fact that legitimate or illegitimate demands for greater
religious liberty can lead to violence be an argument against them?
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self-determination." 27 Thus, in the nineteenth century, the major powers ensured
there was no legal basis for a claim to independence.
We should also remember that not all political instability is bad. Political
instability is bad when it leads to violence. If political instability is merely the
peaceful transition from one government to another, then there is nothing
inherently wrong with that kind of political instability. Elections, after all, are a
form of political instability. If international norms on self-determination can lead
to the peaceful and orderly transition from disgruntled province to independent
state-such as the peaceful split of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for
example-then so much the better.
IV. SELF-DETERMINATION COMES OF AGE
Despite the attempt by leaders of many existing states to limit the idea of
self-determination (say, for example, to limit its application to colonialism2 8),
most commentators have concluded that that attempt has failed, as more and
more groups seek recognition as "a people," and the international community
repeatedly finds that the best way to end a civil war, or oppression of a minority,
is the separation of the warring groups into separate states. Morton H. Halperin
and David J. Scheffer, for example, observed in 1992 that while the international
consensus during the Cold War seemed to be that disaffected minorities within
states were not entitled to self-determination, "developments in international law
• . . are beginning to chip away at . . . [that] interpretation. ' ' 29 More recently,
another scholar has noted, "[s]ince 1995, the practice of states, the transnational
assertiveness of indigenous peoples, and the moral force of groups' rights in
various situations have expanded the scope of the legal right of selfdetermination. 3 °
Powerful forces have pushed to expand the application of the right of selfdetermination. The most pressing of these forces has been the need to halt war,
genocide, or ethnic cleansing. The international community has found it hard to
stand by and permit slaughter (if not outright genocide) in places such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, East Timor, and, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland. Invariably
countries such as Indonesia and the former Yugoslavia protested that these were
internal matters that had no basis for international action. For example, during
27

Binder, 29 Stan J Intl L at 227 (cited in note 24).

28

One such attempt was "to legally restrict application of the term 'colony' to countries or
peoples separated from their colonizers by at least thirty miles of open ocean." Churchill,
PerversionsofJusice at 51 (cited in note 18).
Halperi and Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Orderat 24 (cited in note 7).

29

30

Richard Falk, Se'f-Determinationunder InternationalLaw. The Coherenceof Doctrine Versus the Incoherence
of Experience, in Danspeckgruber, ed, The Self-Determinalion of Peoples 31, 49 (cited in note 6).
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the Security Council debates on the situation in Kosovo on September 23, 1998,
China-a supporter of Serbia/Yugoslavia-declared that "the question of
Kosovo is an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."'"
When the "internal matter" argument fails, the next line of defense is
invariably "maintaining territorial integrity." Interestingly, the draft resolutionput forth by the Russian delegation as a compromise-spoke only of
"autonomy" for Kosovo, avoiding the more powerful term "self-determination,"
and also guaranteed the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia.32 The American
representative also noticeably avoided use of the word "self-determination,"
preferring to use the term "self-government. ' 33 As a result of the UN agreement
with Yugoslavia, Kosovo effectively became independent under the protection
of the UN, even though it remained nominally a part of Yugoslavia.
As the president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, declared on his election in
2001, "[d]e facto we are independent," but "the independence of Kosovo [must]
be recognized formally, as soon as possible. ' 34 Serbia continues to oppose
outright independence for Kosovo (which is widely supported by Kosovars),
31
even though Serbia has not exercised sovereignty in Kosovo for several years.
V. THE FUTURE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The ongoing example of Kosovo raises several important points about
self-determination. The first point is that the very term "self-determination"
appears to be avoided by diplomats, even when it is defacto imposed. Given its
apparent centrality in international law, one would think it would be front and
center. While it is given emphasis by those seeking self-determination, it still
seems to be downplayed by others in the international community. As one
diplomat put it recently, "self-determination was often treated as something like
an 'ugly duckling' in the pool of human rights." 36 Indeed, as the cases of Bosnia,
East Timor and Kosovo show, unless there are violations of individual human
rights such as murder, rape, and torture, the violation of the collective right of
self-determination will receive little attention. Simply consider what the
international reaction would be if the French-speaking citizens of Quebec were
subject to systematic rape and murder by the English-speaking inhabitants that

32

UN SCOR 53d Sess, 3930th mtg at 3, UN Doc S/PV.3930 (1998). For many years this was also
the British position with regard to Northern Ireland.
Id. In February 2003, Yugoslavia was renamed Republic of Serbia and Montenegro.

33

Id at 4.

34

Melinda Henneberger, Kosovo Winner Wants Independence, NY Times A3 (Nov 19, 2001).

35

ProposalforKosovo Autonomy Offered Instead of Independence, NY Times A4 (Aug 13, 2003).
Press Release, UN GAOR 3d Comm, 57th Sess, 29th mtg, UN Doc GA/SHC/3708 (2002)
(statement of Pio Schurti of Liechtenstein).

31

36
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were supported by Canadians in- other provinces and tacitly approved by the
government in Ottawa. Can there be any doubt that in such a circumstance the
Qu6bdcois claims to self-determination would be taken more seriously by the
international community, which at present seems to consider the matter an
internal Canadian problem?
If it is true that the right to self-determination cannot stand alone but
requires an associated campaign of violence, that would seem to defeat the
whole purpose for "self-determination" in international law, namely, preventing
violence and conflict. If "a people" cannot obtain standing under international
law until thousands (or more realistically, hundreds of thousands, if not millions)
of their members have been raped, tortured, or killed, then self-determination
cannot prevent the very thing it is intended to prevent. Shouldn't a cultural or
political minority-which is obviously more sensitive to its own precarious
plight than outsiders-be able to go to the international community and demand
its right to self-determination before ethnic cleansing begins, rather than
afterward?
When viewed as a "human right," self-determination also demands that a
group not be persecuted before it can invoke that right. Would we ever say that
the right to emigrate depends on a person being able to show persecution in his
home country? Obviously the right to travel can be invoked for any reason or no
reason at all, and does not depend on a showing of oppression. One would think
that the right to self-determination would be treated the same way; "a people" is
entitled to self-determination for any reason or no reason at all-it need not
show prior persecution.3 7
This is not to deny that a group's sense of identity as "a people" is often
solidified by persecution,38 but if it is "a people," then its right to selfdetermination already exists and cannot be contingent upon such persecution.
Such a rule in effect would make it illegal to close the barn door until after the
cow has left.

37

38

It may safely be assumed, of course, that large groups of people do not simply wake up one
morning and think "I'll declare my independence today." Getting a large group of people to
agree on pursuing self-determination is not easy, and will inevitably require some strong
showing of benefit. The assumption here is that the people comprising a minority group in the
existing society are in the best position to sense potential threats long before those threats reach
the level of persecution that will attract international attention.
As Halperin and Scheffer comment: "[t]he real mistake occurs when a government is so fearful
of self-determination-even when it is not aimed at secession-that it denies the minority
groups the protections of their traditional rights. Such negativist actions can easily trigger
minority discontent and upheaval and create the surge toward self-determination that the
government so fears." Halperin and Scheffer, SelfDeterminalion in the New World Order at 60
(cited in note 7).
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VI. BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF "A PEOPLE"
The same considerations that suggest a liberal reading of the circumstances
that entitle a people to self-determination imply an equally liberal reading for
which groups qualify as "a people." Hans Adam has suggested that "[t]o grant
the right of self-determination exclusively to those people who have a distinct
ethnic, religious, or cultural background" actually increases "the danger of ethnic
or religious cleansing., 39 If only those groups that have a distinct language and
culture are entitled to self-determination, then leaders fearful of such claims may
go out of their way to destroy the traditions and languages that make the people
unique. This is a recurrent theme in world history, from Turkey's ban on the
Kurdish language and names, to the Soviets' attempts to stamp out non-Russian
languages and traditions, to the British attempts at destroying the distinct
religion and culture of the Irish. Distinct cultures and languages might seem
threatening if such groups possessed a right to self-determination not possessed
by other minority groups. It is easy to imagine governments taking "soft"
measures to curb such distinctions, such as refusing to teach native languages in
government schools.4"
The above argument can be seen as a reason to have less autonomy rather
than more. If the threat of secession will cause rulers to persecute minorities,
then why not simply abandon the whole idea of self-determination? The answer
is that denying self-determination does not work. There was no international law
accepting self-determination decades ago when the British tried to destroy Irish
culture, or when the Soviets tried to destroy Ukrainian culture, or any of the
thousands of historical examples of majorities persecuting minorities. This
Development concludes that in the last fifty years the world has learned that in
such circumstances self-determination is often the best solution. The point
about a broad right of self-determination is that a weak or ambiguous right to
self-determination might actually make circumstances worse for minorities. It
might make minorities seem more threatening to majorities but not provide any
real protection against persecution. A little self-determination, like a little
learning, is a dangerous thing.4
Limiting the right of self-determination to distinct cultural or racial
minorities would also make it impossible for minority groups to make alliances
39

Adam, Forwardat xii (cited in note 10).

40

In some American states it was illegal to teach children foreign languages in either public or
private schools. See the famous case of Myer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (holding that states
could not prohibit the teaching of foreign languages).
"A litle Learning is a dang'rous Thing; Drink deep, or taste not the PierianSpring: There shallow

41

Draughtsintoxicate the Brain, And drinking largey sobers us again." Alexander Pope, An Essay on
Criliism 92 (Sidhartha 1988) (S. L. Paul, ed).
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with each other, or even with supportive individuals of the majority group. Take
Quebec as an example. Suppose, counterfactually, that French speaking Quebec
is 45 percent of the population, widely distributed throughout Quebec, and
suppose that 25 percent of the population is Native American, also for the sake
of argument widely distributed and in favor of independence from Canada.42
Would it make any sense to deny the 70 percent of the population that wants
independence their self-determination because together the groups form a
majority? Or suppose that 45 percent of Quebec is French speaking and another
25 percent of the English speaking population also want independence for one
reason or another. Do these English speakers not count because they are not
culturally distinct from the rest of Canada? Would they count if they learned
French or became Catholic? Put more simply, if a large majority of a province
wants independence, why should the self-determination of those people depend
on being able to show some sort of distinct cultural identity from the rest of the
country?

43

Giving a unique right to certain minority groups and not others might also
cause friction between various groups in society. We have already witnessed
resentment of Quebec's status as a special society by other provinces. The best
way to prevent this sort of friction is to recognize that any distinct minority
group, which is a majority in its region, is entided to the same right of selfdetermination as any other minority group.' If Quebec may leave Canada, why
shouldn't the maritime provinces be allowed to join Quebec or the United
States?
If self-determination is a tool designed to prevent conflict, it can best do its
job the more widely it is applied. This suggests that the concept of "a people"
under international law ought to be applied not simply to religious or cultural

42

Actually, the vast majority of Quebec is French speaking and the Native American tribes are a
tiny minority; the point of the hypothetical is simply to illustrate how a multicultural state could
be created.

43

Needless to say, territorial integrity of existing provinces is no more sacrosanct than territorial
integrity of nations; so if Native American tribes in northern Quebec wished to remain part of
Canada, they would be entitled to self-determination and should not be forced to be part of the
independent nation of Quebec-just as the people of northwestern Virginia in 1861 determined
to remain part of the United States, and Virginia acquiesced by creating West Virginia. This is
another example of how the widest application of self-determination can help prevent conflict:
if Quebec could force Native American tribes to be part of Quebec, a potential
minority/majority conflict could arise.

44

I have used the rather ambiguous term "minority group" rather than simply repeat the term "a
people" to suggest the need to broaden the concept of a people to groups associated by unique
political, geographical, and economic ties (such as the people of the maritime provinces, or the
people of New England). Needless to say, not every group of individuals nor every political unit
would begin to count as "a people."
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minorities, but even to "political minorities." The most obvious example of this
would be Taiwan, which is distinct from mainland China more by politics than
by culture. As was suggested above, the "people of Nova Scotia" are a distinct
political entity, as much as "the people of Quebec" or "the people of Hawaii."
Yet one objection remains. Might a strong and quickly invocable standard
of self-determination for all distinct "peoples" lead to instability in existing
states?45 Might cultural minorities demand their own country each time there is a
slight disagreement, like some religious groups which seem to fracture and start
46
new sects over what seem to outsiders to be fairly trivial doctrinal disputes?
Such concerns seem misplaced in the political context. History and economic
analysis of human behavior show that people do not break their political bonds
and form new ones without serious reasons.
For example, behavioral economists have noted the existence of an
"endowment effect": "Surveys and experiments reveal that people sometimes
demand much more to give up something that they have than they would be
willing to pay to acquire it.",47 People also tend to be "risk adverse" so they will
put up with a lot in order to avoid the unknown-hence the expression, "Better
the devil you know." For example, most people will not change jobs for only a
marginal improvement. Because people tend to value what is familiar over the
unknown, it is hard to convince people to try something new and perhaps risky.
History suggests that endowment effects and risk aversion operate
particularly strongly in attempting to organize new political units. The
Declaration of Independence noted that "all experience hath shewn, that
mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right
themselves by abolishing the forms [of government] to which they are
accustomed." There are hundreds of Native American nations within the
borders of the United States, yet it seems likely that if the United States offered
to recognize their independence, no more than a handful would actually accept.48
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Instability can simply mean any change in the status quo; there is no reason for assuming that
the status quo represents a perfect world which allows for no improvement. Alternatively,
instability can mean chaos which leads to violence and oppression. Self-determination by
definition causes instability in the first sense, but (this Development argues) prevents it in the
second sense by providing a peaceful and lawful framework for the demands of minorities for
greater self-government or independence.
Oxford's Christian Encyclopedia estimates there are 33,820 "distinct Christian denominations
across the world." David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, eds, World
Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Surve of Churches and Religions in the Modem World 3 (Oxford
2d ed 2001).
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 91 (Pearson 4th ed 2004).
Barsh points out that few Native American tribes currently show any inclination to assert their
sovereignty in any serious way, and writes that "it seems that Indians today like being 'number
one' in the world as part of the United States." Barsh, Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determinaion at
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Even within existing systems, which permit regional majorities to form
new cities and counties, it is very difficult to actually get people to agree on
forming a new city or county. In California, for example, there have been many
plans in recent years to form new counties but all have failed.49 Even though
forming a new county is a kind of self-determination allowed in most states, it
does not happen very often. In 2001, rural residents of Colorado formed
Broomfield County out of the rural part of three other counties believing they
would be better represented and that the old county governments had not given
enough attention to these rural folks. But such successes are exceedingly rare.
Broomfield was the first new county in Colorado in almost 100 years, and the
first new county in the United States since the creation of La Paz County,
Arizona more than 20 years ago. Despite the fact that forming a new city or
county may mean significantly lower taxes (for example, when a rich area is
subsidizing a poor area) and a greater level of self-government, it is simply not
easy to convince people to support it.
The US Constitution explicitly provides for new states to be formed out of
old ones, 0 and while Maine broke away from Massachusetts in 1820 and West
Virginia separated from Virginia in 1861, it has been nearly a century and a half
since part of a state has seceded. If it is hard to get people to agree to form a
new county, and even harder to convince people to form a new state, it is
reasonable to conclude that it will be very hard to convince people to start a new
nation.
We should also remember that self-determination does not necessarily
mean independence. The concept of self-determination includes both
independence and the lesser step of self-government or autonomy in varying
degrees. In many instances, such as in Quebec, Northern Ireland, Scotland,
Wales, and Hong Kong, the granting of a greater degree of autonomy or selfgovernment has been sufficient to convince the minorities involved that
complete independence is not necessary. Once the international community
recognizes a particular group as "a people" entitled to self-determination under
international law, the existing government is put on notice that persecution of

154 (cited in note 25). In a good illustration of the endowment effect and risk aversion noted
above Barsh also points out that tribes "prefer to remain safely within familiar orbits" when it
comes to political action. Part of this may be the "sour grapes" effect, where people tend not to
demand things they do not think they can get. Still, there is no evidence that if given the
opportunity Indian tribes would be very likely to demand independence without major
incentives.
49
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"Since the state legislature liberalized the law in 1974, there have been eight efforts to form new
counties. All have failed." Jeff Gottlieb, Corona Wants to Go It Alone, LA Times B1 (Dec 22,
2001).
US Const, art IV, 3.
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that group is not simply an "internal matter." The threat of invoking the right to
independence is a bargaining chip for the minority and an incentive for the
majority to compromise. If the right to independence did not exist, it would be
much easier for majorities to ignore the claims of minorities, and this might lead
to violence as the only perceived alternative of the oppressed minority. In any
case, it seems likely that the practical outcome of a widespread right to selfdetermination for cultural minorities will not be a lot of brand new nations, but
rather an increase in federalized systems in which cultural minorities are given
greater autonomy within the existing state structure. So long as the level of
autonomy ensures that minorities feel they can protect themselves (for example,
by having their own local court system and law enforcement), autonomy may be
enough. This is one possibility for dealing with the Kurdish problem in Iraq, for
example.
Finally, the truly destabilizing influence is an ambiguous standard that
allows both sides to invoke international law or precedent convincingly. In other
words, minority groups can demand self-determination pointing to the various
elements of international law cited above. Existing governments can try to deny
self-determination by arguing that precedents show that these documents do not
really mean what they seem to say. It is this ambiguity which leads to conflict.
Clear laws and clear rules reduce conflict and argument. When laws and
precedents are clear, suits will tend to be settled out of court or not challenged.
When laws are more ambiguous, and each side believes it has the law on its side,
there is greater threat of trial (or conflict)."1 If international law andpracicewere
clear that any attempt to deny self-determination for any community whatsoever
was illegal and unacceptable, then the effect would be to reduce uncertainty and
thus avoid conflict. At the first hint of oppression a minority group could
petition the international community for recognition of the group as simply a
people entitled to self-determination. This would end any doubt about the
oppression of the group being a purely "internal matter" regardless of whether
the group was actually demanding independence or some lesser form of selfdetermination.

51

The objection that some countries might not accept international law is no objection. It is
always the case that some people will not accept a law and will fight against it. One could just as
well argue that some people will not accept the law of adverse possession and will still fight to
keep their property regardless of what the law says. This is no doubt true, but in general we still
think that clear laws about property ownership do more to avoid conflict than to create it. Just
so with international law.
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VII. CONCLUSION
If the international community took more seriously the claims of minority
groups that desire independence or self-government, then perhaps peaceable
solutions, such as the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, could be
the international norm. So long as dominant majorities think there will not be
serious international sanctions, 2 they can continue to deny self-determination
for minority groups-often with tragic results.

52

The question of what form international sanctions would take is beyond the scope of this
Development; one would hope that international pressure without military action would be
enough, as it was in the case of East Timor. It would probably be the case that military action
would not, and should not, be taken by the international community unless there is violence
directed at the minority asserting self-determination. One would expect that once the world
community has recognized that a particular group is entitled to self-determination and said that
any attempt to move against that group will be regarded as a violation of international law,
rulers of the preexisting state will be far less likely to use violence, and actual military
intervention will not be necessary.
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